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Introduction 
Berger and Wol~ert have done the statistics community a 
service by calling our attention once again to the likelihood 
principle CLP) and its implications. They repeat Birnbaum·s 
(1962) message, already admirably recapitulated by Basu (1975) 
and Dawid (1977): if you work within the classical (X, 8, {P8 }>-
paradigm, you want to make inferences about "true 8" on the basis 
of "observed x," and you wish to respect certain fundamental· 
principles of inference <for example, the sufficiency and weak 
conditionality principles>, then your inference had better depend 
, 
upon the observation x through the likelihood function that x 
induces one. In particular, you must accept the implications of 
same other principles that many statisticians regard as false, 
never mind fundamental, like the stopping time and censoring 
principles. 
There are several bail-out options for statisticians who 
choose neither ta fallow the LP to fully conditional analysis nor 
...... 
to raise adhockery to a scientific principle. They can reject 
the ex, 0, {P8 })-paradigm by requiring either more structure Cas 
-do structuralists, pi voteer:., and, perhaps, some "abjecti ve" 
Bayesians) or less (as do defenders of alternative-free 
significance tests and, more drastically, exploratory data 
analysts>; or they cpn modify the fundamental pre-principles so 
that the LP and the ~bjectionable post-principles fail to be 
derivable from them, as _did Durbin (1970) and Kalbfleisch (1975>; 
or they can claim that other, more fundamental principles, like 
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the Confidence Principle, conflict with the LP, making an 
ideological choice among competing principle~ necessary. 
Since Bayesian practice is consistent with the LP, Bayesians 
have no need to refute Birnbaum's work. Indeed, to Berger and 
Wolpert, the LP is a trump card in the Bayesian salesman's hand. 
They argue, as did Basu (1975), that only Bayesian ideas permit 
the LP to be properly implemen~ed and that Bayesian 
considerations unravel the "counterexampl~s" to the LP produced 
by Armitage, Stein, Fraser and others. 
But even to Bayesians, consistency with Bayesian ideas should 
be no guarantee of foundational cogency. For example, the fact 
that (essentially) admissible decision rules are Bayes does not 
recommend Wald's formulation of decision theory to most 
Bayesians. So the question arises: should Bayesians promote 
Birnbaum·s formulation and derivation of the LP as a cornerstone 
of the foundations of statistics? I think not, for two reasons. 
First, the LP is embedded in a paradigm which is not directly 
applicable to many, if not most, of the important real problems 
of statistical inference. Because of the ambiguity and 
limitations of this paradigm, the proof of the LP is not 
compelling. Second, the LP ignores what I regard as the 
fundamental tenet of Bayesianity: the purpose of an inference is 
to quantitate uncertainty. When this tenet is properly taken 
into account, foundational arguments can be adduced that lead 
directly to Bayesian methods. 
The next section elaborates the first of these reasons in 
some detail. For a development of the second, see Lane (1981> 
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and Lane and Sudderth (1984). 
I shall discuss three problems with the LP. The first 
r~lates to the meaning, the second to the adequacy, and the third 
to the relevance of the <X, e, {P8})-parad~gm. BQth the first 
and the second of these problems call the ~erivation of the LP 
into question. 
1). What do the elements of e represent? This question is 
important, since the proof of the LP requires us to consider the 
mixture of two different experiments with "the same e.~ There 
are at least three possible interpretations of the elements e: 
a) 8 is the distribution P8 ; 
b) 0 is an abstract set and'8 merely indexes the 
distribution P8 ; 
c) 8 is a possible value tor some 11 real 11 physical parameter, 
and P8 is to be regarded as the distribution of the 
random quantity x should 0 be the true value of that 
parameter. 
Interpretations a) and b) are mathemati~ally precise. They 
are defined in terms of the assumed model and do not refer to the 
phVsical reality that model is intended to represent. 
Interpretation c> has an entirely different character and 
3 
• ,• .• .... • • , • ~""!". • • 
raises difficult philosophical issues. When - and in what sense 
- do "real" physical parameters exist? If I opt fer 
interpretation c>, must I believe that a coin has a propensity to 
come up heads 8 x 1007. of the time in an (infinitely) long series 
of repeated flips? I am inclined to believe that there may be 
"real" physical parameters in measurement error problems, 
although even here a strict operationalist construction leads to 
interpretation a> rather that c) for the parameter 8: the 
measuring process, encoded as P8 , defines the quantity measured. 
In few other problems to which statistical inference is applied 
are there model-free physical quantities ~tanding behind each 
model parameter. To decide whether or not you agree, think about 
your last regression or time-series analysis. 
Both Berger and Wolpert (pp. 42-3) and Dawid (1977, P. 252) 
seem to favor interpretation c). For example, Berger and Wolpert 
say that the LP applies only when the elements of the two 
parameter sets are "the same parameter, i.e. are physically or 
conceptually the same quantity." Unfortunately, they·neglect to 
tell us how we are to decide when two different experiments 
measure the same quantity or how to deal with ~odel parameters 
that lack any natural interpretation in terms of physical 
quantities. Moreover, in virtually all of their examples the set 
0 is uninterpreted and me~ely serves to index the set of 
distributions {P8 }, which suggests that in these cases they are 
thinking about 0 in the ~ense of interpreta~ion b). It is hard 
to take the LP seriously as a foundational instrument if we must 
always interpret the elements of e as "real" physical quantities, 
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unless we are given some guidance on what constitutes reality and 
how reality is tied to mathematics by the model we select. 
It matters which of the three interpretations we give to the 
elements of e. They lead to very different conclusions about the 
validity of the derivation of the LP. Interpretation a) gives no 
scope for the mixture principle: only experiments whose sampling 
distributions are identical share "the sam~ e." As such, the LP 
is reduced ta the sufficiency principle and; for example, the 
stopping time principle does not follow from the LP. 
Interp~etation b), on the other hand, gives tremendous scope 
for mixing. Any two experiments with the same index set can be 
mixed. Consequently, if there are a pair of observations, one 
from each experiment, that yield the same likelihood function an 
the index set e, the LP then declares that the "evidence" or 
"inference" derived from the two experiments with these two 
observations must be identical. This is a startlingly unBayesian 
conclusion. For example, must my predictive inference for the 
next outcome in any sequence of Bernoulli trials in which I have 
so far obtained three successes and one failure be the same? But 
what in the mathematic~ of the LP proof precludes interpreting e 
purely as an index set and so deriving a version of the LP that 
conflicts with Bayesian practice? 
The ioundational status of the LP cannot be determined until 
e is int~rpreted. Depending on whether one adopts interpretation 
a>, b) or t>, the LP _is devoid of interestfng consequences, 
wrong, or severely and ambiguously restricted in its domain of 
applicability. 
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2). The proof of the LP is convincing only in so far as the 
sufficiency and weak conditionality principles are intuitively 
compelling. While Bayesian practice respects both principles, 
only weak conditionality seems unarguable on its face. I share 
I.J. Bood·s reaction ta the sufficiency principle, as reported in 
his discussion of Birnbaum (1962). Despite Fisher's gift for 
suggestive names <what more could you possibly need than 
something that is sufficient?>, the fact that the distribution of 
x given the value of a statistic Tis 8-free does not immediately 
impel me ta base my inference only on the value of T. 
Suppose, though, that the observation xis generated by first 
generating a value for T according to a distribution indexed by 
some element of the parameter set e, and then an extraneous 
randomization mechanism is used to pick an x on the orbit of the 
observed value of T. In such a case, it is clear that Tis 
sufficient and that inference about 0 should be based only on T. 
(The sufficient statistic that appea~s in the derivation of the 
LP does not bear this postrandomization relation ta the 
observation x.> 
Now for a~y sufficient statistic T defined on? statistjcal 
model CX, 0, {P8 >>, there is no way to te!i from the information 
encoded in (X, 0, {P6 }> whethe~ the observation xis or is not 
generated from T by postrandomization. So, if you do not find 
the sufficien~y principle compelling except in the 
postrandomization case, you musi agfee with Barnard and Fraser 
that not enough information is encoded in <X, 0, {P8 }) upon which 
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to base a general principle of inference. And I believe that 
this conclusion is correct. After all, the information in <X, e, 
{P8 )> says nothing about how the model repr~sents reality, and it 
is hard to see how a principle of inference can disregard the 
details of this representation. Though we u~e models to gui~e 
the way we formulate inferences, the inferences themselves have 
value to us only if they yield useful statements about the world. 
3). Even though "inference" is undefined in the LP formulation, 
tne validity of the LP seems to depend on two premises about the 
nature of inference in the CX, e, <P8})-paradigm: 
a) the purpose of inference is to make some statement about 
the "true" value of an unobservable parameter 8 on the 
basis of an observed quantity x; 
b) 8 exists independently of the "e}~periment" E that 
produces x, and information about 0 can be separated into 
two components, one deriving just from E (to which the LP 
refers) and the other from "other information" presumably 
preexisting E. 
I believe that these premises are rarely true in real situations 
to which statistical inference is applied. If I am right, the 
scope of the LP as a foundational instrument is narrow. 
Except·for measurement error problems, the real aim of 
inference is usually to ge1erate a prediction about the value of 
some future observabl~s; see Beisser (1971 and 1984) and 
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Aitchison and Dunsmore ·c1975> for extensive discussion of this 
proposition and further references. This is especially true in 
situations where the model parameters do not represent real 
physical quantities, the typical case in regression and time-
series analyses. Estimating model parameters is in general a 
"half-way house" on the way to predicting some relevant future 
observation, and much can be lost by focussing foundational 
dis~ussion on the half-way house instead of the ultimate 
destination. For example, the relevant uncertainty for a patient 
\ 
with a particular clinical condition undergoing 4 particular 
therapy is not a confidence band for an estimated survival curve; 
rather, the patient and his physician should be concerned with 
~ 
the predictive distribution for that patient·s future lifetime. 
The inferential question of interest to the patient is how to 
generate this predictive distribution. 
The LP does not address this question directly. Berger and 
Wolpert claim that prediction can be embedded in the LP framework 
by including the future observable as part of the unknown 
parameter. But then a itself appears as a nuisance parameter 
that is clearly not "noninformative" in the sense of Berger and 
l.rJol pert. LP ideas provide no guidance an the treatment of 
informative nuisance parameters. On the other hand, deFinetti"s 
~ubjective Bayesian theory is directed towards the problem of 
predicting future observables, and the notion of coherence 
derived from that theory provides a foundational basis for 
predictive inference, see Lane and Sudderth (1984). In this 
theory, models may be used to help generate predictions about the 
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future observable y based upon ob~erved x, but the models merely 
provide a convenient structure and need carry no metaphysical 
burden of "reality" for the parameters they contain. 
The premise b) cited above ignores the fact that model 
parameters are frequently inseparable from the "experiment" whose 
possible distributions they in~ex. Especially in applications 
arising in nonexperimental sciences lfke e~onometrics or resource 
management, the model is sculptured either from data already in 
hand or perhaps from a realis~ic view of what data are 
potentially obtainable. In such cases, there is no way to 
separate what <E,x> says about 8 frc;,m "prior" information about 
8; in fact, 8 cannot be said to exist prior to the information of 
E, even though there may be much pri~r irformation about which x 
might be observed. In these situatjons it is hard to criticize 
"objective" Bayesians who violate the LP by letting their 
"priors" depend upon the structure of the experiment E. 
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